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ABSTRACT 
In the midst of various taxpayer "revolts" and federal budget 
deficits of unprecedented magnitude, noncompliance with federal and 
state income tax laws has become an issue of significant policy 
concern. If the IRS' budget is limited, the probability that any 
individual taxpayer will be audited depends on the behavior of other 
taxpayers. Thus the problem of compliance involves a "congestion" 
effect, which generates strategic interaction among taxpayers as well 
as between taxpayers and the IRS. This paper reflects an initial 
attempt to explore how the combination of a strategic IRS and 
asymmetric information affects the traditional theoretical results on 
tax compliance behavior. 
A MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE WITH BUDGET-CONSTRAINED AUDITORS 
Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of various taxpayer "revolts" and federal budget deficits 
of unprecedented magnitude, noncompliance with U. S. federal and state income 
tax laws has become an issue of significant policy concern. An American Bar 
Association Conference held in 1983 devoted to the topic suggested that the 
"compliance gap" is running at 10 to 15 percent of total taxable income, 
resulting in uncollected taxes totalling about $100 billion. More recently, 
the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control reported that IRS tax 
examinations have decreased from 2. 4 percent of all returns in 1977 to 1.7 
percent in 1983. 
Despite the shocking nature of noncompliance estimates, our 
understanding of the relationship between compliance with the tax laws and the 
structure of sanctions and efficacy of law enforcement strategies is in an 
infant stage. The economics-based literature on crime and punishment has made 
little genuine progress since the basic theoretical structure was established 
fifteen years ago by Gary Becker (1968) . Much work has been done by 
economists using this general model since then, including additional 
theoretical work as well as extensive empirical work in the context of 
noneconomic crimes such as murder and noneconomic penalties such as death. 
The empirical work to date remains highly controversial (e. g. ,  Ehrlich, 1975 
and 1977) and the improvements in theory have failed to yield additional 
practical, policy-relevant insights (e. g. , Polinsky and Shavell, 1979; Landes, 
1983). In particular, there has been little effort to develop and test 
theoretical models designed to be useful to federal, state or local law 
enforcement agencies in establishing and implementing effective programs. 
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The model we present in this paper differs substantially from those 
found in the extant economics literature on tax evasion. Much of that 
literature treats noncompliance as a problem in decisionmaking under 
uncertainty where the taxpayer faces given probabilities of detection and 
conviction, and given tax and penalty functions (e. g. , Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972, Srinivasan, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974). The problem then is to characterize 
compliance incentives given these exogenous parameters. Extensions of this 
basic approach often have focused on standard labor supply decisions (e. g. , 
Andersen, 1977; Baldry, 1979; Pencavel, 1979) or on trade-offs between labor 
supply in primary markets where the wage is observable and secondary markets 
where it is not (e. g. , Isachsen and Strom, 1980; Sandmo, 1981). In some cases 
attention has been given to the optimal choice of probabilities of detection 
for proscribed behavior, usually giving the government free rein to set a 
number of instruments in order to maximize a measure of social welfare (e. g. , 
Fishburn, 1979; Kemp and Ng, 1979; Polinsky and Shavell, 1979; Sandmo, 1981; 
Landsberger and Meilijson, 1982). While Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) and 
Greenberg (1984) do condition the probability of audit in a given period on 
whether the taxpayer was caught under-reporting in some prior period, in none 
of these models is the likelihood of audit in a given period ever made 
dependent on currently observed behavior, such as a level of income reported 
to the IRS. It is clear, however, that actual IRS audits are not entirely 
random, even within classes of taxpayers, and it is important to introduce 
this fact into economic models. It is also important, then, to ask how the 
probability of audit, contingent on reported income, is determined by the IRS. 
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There are two basic ways to approach the problem. The first is via 
the principal-agent framework, viewing the IRS as principal and the taxpayer 
as agent. A recent example of this kind of model can be found in Reinganum 
and Wilde (forthcoming) .  A second way to approach the problem is via game 
theory using, in particular, techniques from the literature on games of 
incomplete information. The difference between the two approaches is that the 
latter presumes no precommitment on the part of any actor, be it the IRS or 
taxpayers. Taking the structure of taxes and fines as given, the IRS picks an 
audit strategy and the taxpayers pick reporting strategies, each of which must 
be optimal against the other. 
While it seems natural to apply game theory to the problem of tax 
compliance, there are surprisingly few models which do so. The two leading 
examples are due to Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) and Greenberg (1984). 
However, these authors focus on repeated games, and, as noted above, only tie 
audit probabilities to whether a taxpayer was caught under-reporting in the 
past -- they do not incorporate the crucial role of self-reporting in the 
tax-compliance game. This paper, along with a companion piece (Graetz, 
Reinganum and Wilde, 1983), reflects an initial attempt to explore how the 
combination of a strategic IRS and asymmetric information affects the 
traditional theoretical results on tax compliance behavior. 
One of the most prevalent features of actual law enforcement systems 
is the presence of budget constraints--one seldom hears police chiefs, judges 
or wardens complaining about too many officers, too few cases on the docket, 
or excess prison space. There is evidence that the IRS is also constrained to 
audit fewer returns than is optimal. Vitez (1983) states that in 1979 the IRS 
information matching program generated 9.4 million cases of under-reporting, 
but only 3.6 million of these were investigated. These investigations 
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resulted in an average ex post revenue/cost ratio of 10: 1. While the marginal 
ex ante revenue/cost ratio was undoubtedly lower, there is no reason to 
believe that it was unity. Clearly, information on the actual value of the 
latter would need to be obtained in order to properly evaluate the efficacy of 
expanding the IRS budget in generating increased compliance. In any event, we 
take as our starting point in this paper the presence of a budget constraint, 
although we do not necessarily assume it is binding. If the budget constraint 
is binding, however, the probability that any individual taxpayer will be 
audited depends on the behavior of other taxpayers. This "congestion" feature 
of the compliance problem has been largely ignored in the crime and punishment 
literature generally (except see Nagin (1978) who points out that the observed 
negative relationship between index crime rates and sanction levels may be 
explained by a constraint on total prison populations), and appears nowhere in 
the literature on tax compliance. Some authors do consider the effects of 
budget constraints (e. g., Greenberg, 1984), but none explicitly model the 
strategic interaction between taxpayers so the congestion effect never arises. 
There are also surveys which report that noncompliance is more likely as a 
taxpayer knows more other taxpayers who have failed to comply (e.g. , Spicer 
and Lundstedt, 1976; Song and Yarbrough, 1978). But the explanations of fered 
for this phenomenon usually are psychological or sociological, not economic. 
In Section 2 we present a model in which two taxpayers confront an IRS 
able to audit at most one of them. The IRS is permitted to use a sequential 
auditing strategy, conditioning its decision to audit on the number of 
unaudited low reports remaining. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium 
exists with a sequential auditing strategy, an alternative equilibrium exists 
in which the IRS employs a nonsequential strategy, and equilibrium taxpayer 
compliance is the same. In Section 3 this model is generalized to an 
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arbitrarily large number of taxpayers confronting an IRS that can audit at 
most some fraction of them. Considering the taxpayers as a group, taking the 
IRS audit strategy as given, we find that multiple equilibrium reporting 
strategies are possible if the budget constraint is neither too low nor too 
high. However, once the IRS is added as a strategic actor, we find that the 
equilibrium is often unique, and that a binding budget constraint generally 
leads to total noncompliance. If the budget constraint is not binding, both 
audits and noncompliance are probabilistic, the unique equilibrium being 
similar to the one analyzed in Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1983) . In Section 
4 we discuss these results in more detail, and conclude in Section 5 with some 
general remarks on future work. 
2. THE BASIC MODEL: TWO TAXPAYERS, ONE AUDIT 
Consider a situation in which two identical taxpayers confront an IRS 
which can afford to audit at most one of them. Income is uncertain and takes 
one of two values, IL or IH' where IH > IL > O. The probability of high 
income is q. Taxpayers observe their own income and then make a report to the 
IRS, which only observes the taxpayer's true income if an audit is performed 
at cost c, where c > O. The tax levels are TL and TH for low and high income 
respectively, where TH > TL 2 0. If a taxpayer is audited and found to be 
under-reporting, a fine of F is collected in addition to the unpaid taxes. We 
assume Ti + F � Ii for i = L, H and TH i IL' so it is possible, in principle, 
for a low income taxpayer to report high income. Tax rates and fines are 
taken as given by all parties. 
Taxpayers and the IRS are assumed to be risk-neutral, but the results 
are not substantially affected if the taxpayers are risk averse. Taxpayers 
are assumed to minimize expected net tax system costs (taxes plus fines) and 
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the IRS maximizes expected net revenue (taxes plus fines minus audit costs) . 
In principle, taxpayers with low income could report IH. But it would never 
pay to do this since TL < TH. Thus we need only consider whether a taxpayer 
with high income reports honestly. 
ai = Prob{taxpayer i reports IL l taxpayer i has income IH} .
The IRS observes the total number of low income reports and high 
income reports. It then decides on (1) an ordering of taxpayers and (2) a set 
of associated audit probabilities which are exercised sequentially until 
either all taxpayers or the budget is exhausted. As with high income reports 
by taxpayers with low income, it never pays the IRS to audit those who report 
high income since doing so increases audit costs without increasing expected 
tax revenues. Thus we need only condition audit probabilities on the number 
of taxpayers who have reported low income and have not yet faced an audit 
lottery. Furthermore, since these taxpayers are indistinguishable to the IRS, 
the order in which they face the sequence of audit lotteries is random. 
Define, for i = 1 and 2, 
f:\ Prob{IRS audits the next (randomly chosen) taxpayer who reported IL 
when i such taxpayers remain } .  
We have elsewhere (�983) used this model to analyze the effect of 
"honest" taxpayers (who always report truthfully) on the compliance behavior 
of "strategic" taxpayers (who select a reporting strategy so as to maximize 
expected net income) . In that model no budget constraint is imposed on the 
IRS so there is no direct interaction between the reporting strategies of the 
taxpayers -- a Nash Equilibrium for the game can be characterized simply by 
considering the interaction between the IRS and a representative taxpayer. 
However, once a budget constraint is imposed on the IRS, the likelihood of 
audit facing one taxpayer depends on the reporting strategy of the other 
taxpayers. Thus it becomes useful to consider first the interaction between 
the taxpayers in selecting their reporting strategies, taking the IRS audit 
strategy as given. 
2a. Taxpayer Equilibria 
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(1/2>P2 + (1/2) (1 - p2>p1• Thus we can write the expected cost of reporting 
IL with probability ai when income is actually IH (given that the other 
taxpayer uses the strategy aj and the IRS uses the strategy Cp1,p2>> as 
C(ai; aj,p1,p2> = ai [(l - aj) q[p1(TH + F) + (
1 - p1>TL] 
+ (1 - q + ajq) {[(
1/2Jp2 + (1/2) (1 - �2Jp1J CTH +Fl 
+ [1 - C1/2Jp2 - (1/2) (1 - p2Jp1J TL } 
8 
+ (1 - ai) TH. (
1) 
In this model, the likelihood of audit depends on two factors, the 
probability of "exposure" to an "audit lottery" and the probability of audit 
given exposure. For example, suppose one taxpayer always reports low income 
and suppose P1 = 1 p2, so that the IRS would always audit any taxpayer who 
reports low income if it had the resources to do so. If the second taxpayer 
reports low income, he or she will be indistinguishable from the first 
taxpayer and will thus face a probability of exposure of one-half (since in 
this model there are only two taxpayers and at most one can be audited ) .  
However, given exposure, the probability o f  audit i s  one. Of course, it need 
not be; P1 and p2 wiil ultimately be determined in equilibrium. But for now 
we take them as given, and analyze the taxpayers' reporting strategies, a1 and 
A 
A best response for agent i is a strategy, ai(aj; p1,p2> such that 
A 
C(ai(aj; p1,p2J:aj,p1,p2> � C(a; aj,p1,p2> for all other strategies a. 
* * 
A 
taxpayer equilibrium is a pair of strategies, a1Cp1,p2J and a2Cp1,p2J, such 
A * * * * 
that ai(aj; p1,p2) = ai<p1,p2J for i = 
1,2; that is, a1<p1,p2J and a2<p1,p2J 
are best responses to each other, given p1 and p2• 
and 
For notational convenience, define 
k 
kl 
(TH - TL) / ( TH - TL +Fl, 
P2 + <1 - P2>P1· 
02· 
k2 = 
2p1q + cp2 + (1 - p2Jp1JC1 - ql. 
Suppose taxpayer i observes high income. If he or she reports low 
income then there is a chance of being audited. If the other taxpayer, say 
taxpayer j, reports high income, which happens with probability (1 - aj) q, 
then the probability of audit is just P1. If the other taxpayer reports low 
income, which happens with probability 1 - q + ajq' then the probability of 
audit depends on whether the other taxpayer is audited first, since only one 
can be audited. But taxpayers are indistinguishable to the IRS except for 
their reported incomes, so the probability of audit is 
Proposition 1: A taxpayer equilibrium (TE) always exists and is symmetric, 
* 
but may not be unique. Let a Cp1,p2> denote a symmetric TE. Two cases are 
possible. 
(A) P 2 - (1 + P2>P1 > o: In this case k2 < k1. Furthermore, 
(i) 
(ii) 
* 
If k � k2/2. then a Cp1,p2> = O is the unique TE; 
If k2/2 < k < k1/2, then the unique TE is given by 
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* 0 a c p1,p2> = a  Cp1,p2> = C
2k - k2l/qCp2 - (1 + p2>p1J . (4) 
* 
(iii) If k1/
2 i k, then a (p1,p2> = 1 is the unique TE; 
(B) p2 - (1 + p2>p1 � 0: In this case k1 � k2• Furthermore, 
(i) 
* 
If k < k1/
2, then a Cp1,p2> = 0 is the unique TE; 
(ii) If k1/
2 i k i k2/2, three TE exist, both pure strategy TE and the 
mixed strategy TE a0<p1,p2) given in (4) above; 
* 
(iii) If k2/2 i k, then a <p1,p2) = 1 is the unique TE. 
The proof of this result and those that follow can be found in the 
appendix to this paper. Cases (A) and (B) of the proposition are illustrated 
in Figures l(A) and l(B) , respectively. In Figure l(B) , k2 is presumed to be 
less than 1 although this need not be so. It is always the case that k1 < 1. 
By definition, k = 1 when F = 0 and k goes to zero as F gets large. Thus, if 
the fine is low, no compliance is always a TE, and if it is high enough, full 
compliance is always a TE. If it is of intermediate size (relative to p1 and 
P2>. then the mixed strategy TE also emerges. In this situation it is case 
(B) that is of particular interest since it illustrates the congestion effect 
mentioned in the introduction. Moreover, this case arises whenever p1 = p2 or 
whenever p1 = 1, neither of which is unnatural. 
2b. The Full Compliance Game 
Since all taxpayer equilibria are symmetric, the IRS can treat 
taxpayers identically, and needs only consider the total number of unaudited 
low income reports (relative to its remaining budget) in order to determine 
the optimal audit probability with which to confront the next randomly 
selected taxpayer. Since in this model the budget constraint allows only one 
audit and there are only two taxpayers, the problem is reduced to selecting p1 
and P2• where p1 applies when one unaudited low income report remains and p2 
applies when both taxpayers have reported low income. Define the posterior 
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probability that a taxpayer who reports low income actually has high income to 
be µ. Then 
µ aq/[l - q + aq] ( S) 
where a is some symmetric taxpayer reporting strategy. Expected revenue when 
only one unaudited low income report remains is 
1 R CP1; a) = p1[µ(TH + Fl + (1 - µ) TL - c] + (1 - p1lTL 
and when two unaudited low income reports remain is 
2 1 
R Cp1,p2; a) = p2[µ(TH + Fl + Cl - µ) TL - c] + Cl - P2>R <p1;a) 
(6) 
( 7) 
Equation (7) includes only expected income from the audited taxpayer since it 
applies only when both taxpayers report low income -- only one can be audited 
and the taxpayer who doesn't get audited will pay TL whomever he or she turns 
out to be. This constant TL is irrelevant to the decision problem of the IRS. 
A A best response for the IRS is a pair of strategies P1(a) and 
A lA 1 2A A 2 P2(a) such that R Cp1(a) ; a) 2. R Cp1; a) and R <P1CaJ,p2Ca) ; a) 2. R CP1,p2; a) 
for any other strategies p1 and p2• A Nash Equilibrium is a set of strategies 
(�,j1,
j2J such that (i) ; is a taxpayer equilibrium given j1 and 
j2, and (ii) 
- A - - - -
P i = Pi(a) for i = 
1,2; that is, p1 and p2 are best res ponses to a. 
Lemma 1: The best response functions for the IRS are: 
.. (o) < {:'·" 
and 
if a i a 
if a = a 
if a 2. a 
where 
A 
112Ca) 
[ 0 
l [0, 1] 
if a < a 
if a 2 a 
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a =  (1 - q)c/q(TH + F - TL - c). ( 8) 
Proposition 2: A Nash Equilibrium (NE) always exists, but it may not be 
unique. Four cases are possible. 
(A) c > q(TH + F - TL): Here (a, 111.112> = (l, 0, 0) is the unique NE 
(B) c � q(TH + F - TL): Three subcases are possible. 
(i) k > (1 + q)/2: Here c;, p1.P2> = (1, 1, 112> is a NE for any 
112 8 [0, 1]. ' 
(ii) Cl + q)/2 2 k 2 1/2: Here (a, 111.112> 
112 8 [0, 1]. If 
(l, l, 112> is a NE for any 
aoCl, 112> (1 + q - 2k)/q > a, (9) 
where a0 is defined in (4) and a is defined in (8) , then two other 
NE exist, one with (a, p1, 112> 
and the other with (a, p1, p2> 
0 (a (l, 112J, l, 112> for any 112 s [O,l],
(a, b1,b2J, where b1 and b2 are any 
b1 • [O, l] and b2 • [0, 1] such that 
bl 
b2[aq + (1 - q)J - 2k 
(a - l)q(l + b2) ·_ (1 - b2l
; (10) 
(iii) k � 1/2: Here (a, 111.112> = (a, b1,b2) is a NE for any b1 • [O, l]
and b2 • [0, 1] such that (10) holds. 
To interpret Proposition 2. recall that k = (TH - TL) /(TH - TL + F), 
so that it is inversely related to the level of the fine. If 
c > q(TH + F - TL) then it never pays to audit anyone and no one complies. 
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Otherwise there is always some auditing. How much depends on the size of the 
fine relative to the other parameters. When the fine is small enough -- case 
B(i) -- no one ever complies, but as many low income reports as possible are 
audited. Since 111 = 1, 112 is irrelevant and if both taxpayers report low 
income they face equal chances of being audited. If the fine is somewhat 
higher -- case B(ii) -- multiple equilibria are possible, some in which p1 
and others in which both 111 and 112 are between zero and one. In these 
1 
equilibria there is a unique compliance strategy given by a = a, but 111 and 112 
can trade off against each other in a variety of ways. If the fine is high 
enough -- case B(iii) -- these latter equilibria are the only ones that exist. 
The following Corollary is of interest in its own right, and proves 
useful for subsequent analysis. 
Corollary 1: Suppose c � q(TH + F - TL - c) and 1 + q - 2k > qa; that is, 
condition (9) holds. Then there exists b s (0, 1) such that (10) holds with 
bl = b2 = b. 
In other words, if there exists a pair of audit probabilities, b1 and 
b2, such that (a, 111, p2J = (a, b1, b2l is a NE, then there is a nonsequential 
strategy which is also a NE with a = a. Therefore, the IRS can forego the 
more complicated sequential strategies in which 111 and 112 differ, in favor of 
the simpler strategy of exposing all taxpayers to the same audit probability 
until its budget is exhausted. We will make use of this fact in the next 
section. 
3. THE MODEL WITH MANY TAXPAYERS 
Several variations of the basic model analyzed in Section 2 are 
possible, but we will only consider one in this paper. It is of some policy 
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importance to understand the trade-off between fines and the likelihood of 
audit in generating increases in compliance. To do that in this model we let 
the number of taxpayers get arbitrarily large and assume that only some 
fraction of them can be audited by the IRS. Otherwise we retain the 
assumptions of the basic model. However, in light of Corollary 1, we will 
focus on nonsequential IRS strategies in which the probability of audit given 
exposure is constant. 
The analysis proceeds much as in Section 2. In particular, it will 
still be the case that taxpayers with low income will never report high 
income, and the IRS will never audit high income reports. Thus, we need only 
consider the taxpayers' decision whether to report low income when true income 
is high and the IRS's decision whether to audit when low income reports are 
observed. We again proceed with taxpayer equilibria first and then add the 
IRS to the problem. 
3a. Taxpayer Equilibria 
Assume there exists an arbitrarily large number of taxpayers but the 
IRS can only afford to audit A percent of them, where 0 < A < 1. As before,
whether a taxpayer gets audited depends on two factors, the probability of 
exposure and the probability of audit given exposure. The latter is denoted 
by p. If P � A, then by the law of large numbers, the probability of exposure 
is one, since p percent of those exposed get audited, and A percent of the 
population can be audited in principle. If p > A, then the probability of 
exposure depends on the reporting strategies of the other taxpayers. In 
particular, 
Prob{exposure to an audit l IL is reported} 
' 'a .. J, min{l, 1 
_ q + aq (
11) 
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where a is the symmetric reporting strategy used by all taxpayers. The logic 
behind (11) is that A/P is the expected limit on the percentage of taxpayers 
who can be audited. But 1 - q + aq is the expected percentage who report IL. 
Thus (A/P) /(1 - q + aq) is the expected proportion of those who report IL who 
actually face the audit lottery p. It turns out that (A/P>/<1 - q + aq) < 1 in 
equilibrium if and only if P < A/(1 - q) . Hence if p 2 A/(1 - q) , we can 
write the expected tax-system costs for a taxpayer using reporting strategy a 
when all other taxpayers use y as 
C(a; y,p) a[p(TH + F) + (1 - PlTL] + (
1 - a) TH, 
and if p < A/(1 - q) 
C(a;y,p) a{[(A/p>/Cl - q + yq)] [p(TH +Fl + (
1 - P>TL] 
+ [1 - (A/p) /(1 - q + yq) ]TL } + (
1 - a) TH. 
Best responses and taxpayer equilibria are defined analogously to those in 
Section 2. 
(12) 
(13) 
Proposition 3: When the number of taxpayers is arbitrarily large and audits 
are limited to A percent, a taxpayer equilibrium (TE) always exists and is 
symmetric, but may not be unique. Three cases are possible, depending on A
and k. 
(A) A k(l - q) : * Here a (p) = 1 is the unique TE. 
(B) k(l - q) � A � k: Here a*(p) = 1 is always a TE. Furthermore, if P 2 k, 
two other TE exist, a* c pJ 0, and 
* 
a (p) 0 - 1-.::...Jj�k a 
" qk - . 
* (C) k < A: Here a (p) 1 is a TE if p � k and a*<p> 
(14) 
0 is a TE if p 2 k. 
lS 
Figures 2(A), 2(B), and 2(C) illustrate these three cases. Notice 
that a*(fl) = a0, the mixed strategy TE given in (14), is independent of (3, but 
is increasing in F and A. Thus equilibrium noncompliance increases with the 
penalty F and with the IRS' audit capability. These peculiar features will be 
discussed further in Section 4. 
3b. The Full Compliance Game 
The problem facing the IRS, given a symmetric taxpayer equilibrium a, 
is exactly the same as in Section 2. Thus the next proposition is immediate, 
the proof following exactly as that of Proposition 2. The definition of Nash 
Equilibrium for this case also mimics that of Section 2. 
Proposition 4: When the number of taxpayers is arbitrarily large and audits 
are limited to A percent, a Nash Equilibrium (NE) always exists, but it may 
not be unique. Four cases are possible. 
(A) c > q(TH + F - TL): Here (a,(3) = (1,0) is the unique NE. 
(B) c i q(TH + F - TL): Three subcases are possible. 
(i) A <  k(l - q): Here (a,j) = (1,1) is the unique NE. 
-- 0 (ii) k(l - q) i A i k: Here (a,(3) = (1,1) is always a NE. If a 
where a is defined in (8), and a0 is defined in (14) then 
(a,p) 
(-;;:,j) 
(a,(3) is a NE for all p l k. If a0 > a, then 
(a0,1) is a NE. 
(iii) A > k: Here (a,p) (a,k) is the unique NE. 
a, 
The three subcases (in which f3 > 0) are illustrated in Figures 2(A), 2(B) and 
2(C), along with the various taxpayer equilibria for the limiting case. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
In a sense, the limiting case of Section 3 is the more interesting of 
the two models. The assumption of an arbitrarily large number of taxpayers 
eliminates certain second-order effects and thus greatly simplifies the 
results. In particular, the mixed strategy taxpayer equilibria are 
independent of f3 so comparative statics are easier. For example, when 
A <  k(l - q), (a,j) = (1,1) is the unique NE, so the marginal effects of 
changes in the underlying parameters are nil; when k(l - q) � A i k, two NE 
are possible (ignoring the knife-edge case), (a,(3) (1,1) and (a,(3) = (a0,1); 
and when A> k, the unique NE is (a,j) = (a,k). The effects of changes in TL' 
0 TH, F, A, 1 and c on a , a, and k are given in Table 1. 
The anomalous equilibrium in this model is the mixed strategy 
equilibrium when k(l - q) � A � k: c';;:,j) = (a0,1). Here A/j < 1 - q + aq so 
that the budget constraint is binding. But relaxing the budget constraint 
induces an increase in noncompliance since the IRS abil.ity to audit more 
taxpayers must be compensated by an increase in noncompliance to keep 
individual taxpayers indifferent between complying and not complying. Similar 
logic explains the fact that a0 is increasing in q, F and TH and decreasing in 
TL. 
The more natural equilibrium in Which the taxpayers play mixed 
strategies (as well as the IRS in this case) occurs when A > k. In this case, 
however, the budget constraint is not binding and the comparative statics are 
similar to those found in Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1983). Increases in 
the tax on high income or decreases in the tax on low income increase both 
compliance and auditing. Increases in the fine increase compliance and 
decrease auditing. Increases in the proportion of taxpayers who can be 
audited have no effect since the budget constraint is not binding. Increases 
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in the probability of high income or decreases in the cost of auditing have no 
ef fect on auditing but both increase compliance. 
The conclusion here is that when the budget constraint is binding, one 
equilibrium is for taxpayers never to comply and the IRS to audit as many as 
possible, each with probability one. Of course, the ef fective probability of 
audit is then k. If k is small enough this is the only equilibrium. If it is 
slightly larger, another equilibrium in which some compliance occurs can 
exist. However, this equilibrium is dominated in expected cost terms, as 
viewed by the taxpayers, by the "never comply" alternative. If taxpayers are 
able to coordinate on the "never comply" taxpayer equilibrium (e.g., organize 
a "tax revolt"), then we would expect to observe the pure strategy equilibrium 
(a,p) = (1,1) rather than any mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus, generally 
speaking, a binding budget constraint yields pure strategy outcomes. If k is 
high enough, a more sensible mixed strategy equilibrium occurs (and is 
unique). This equilibrium involves both probabilistic audits and 
probabilistic compliance. 
A natural question which this raises is when do the various cases 
occur? To get a feel for this consider the following example using fines 
proportional to evaded taxes; i. e., F = n(TH - TL). Here k =  1/(1 + n) so 
(�.�) = (1,1) is an equilibrium outcome unless k > 1/(1 + n). If n were on 
the order of .s to 1.0, we need k greater than .67 in the former case and . 5
in the latter. Overall, the IRS currently audits about 2 percent of all 
returns, although perhaps as many as 5 percent are considered for possible 
auditing. Even if n = 3 (which is highly unlikely in practice), it would 
require k > .25 to yield any compliance at all. 
A final point concerns the IRS objective function. Suppose compliance 
is important to the IRS, in addition to expected net revenue. If the maximum 
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proportion of taxpayers the IRS can audit is small -- k < k(l - q) -- which is 
likely to be the case in practice, then nothing the IRS can do will yield an 
equilibrium in which everyone complies. However, if the maximum proportion of 
taxpayers the IRS can audit is somewhat larger -- k 2 k 2 k(l - q) -- then if 
the IRS audits as many taxpayers as it can afford -- p = 1 -- it is possible 
that taxpayers will always comply. Of course, the IRS would maximize expected 
revenue by setting P = 0 if taxpayers set � = 0, but if it left p = 1, then it 
would suffer identical audit costs and only forego the lost fine revenue. But 
this is only a possibility since � = O is not the unique taxpayer equilibrium 
in this case and, in fact, it is dominated in expected cost terms, as viewed 
by the taxpayers, by a = 1. In the third case, k > k, the IRS is in a better 
position: a marginal increase in the probability of audit above the 
equilibrium value of k will guarantee full compliance at a trivial increase in 
audit costs. It would, however, still entail a substantial decrease in fine 
revenue. 
S. CON CLUSION 
The primary results of this paper are two-fold. First, a budget 
constraint on IRS auditing introduces a nontrivial interdependence between 
taxpayers' reporting strategies. Second, in the simple models used here, an 
equilibrium in which the budget constraint is binding almost always has high­
income taxpayers under-reporting with probability one and the IRS always 
auditing as many taxpayers who report low income as possible. Thus, in the 
limiting case, for example, each taxpayer faces an ef fective audit probability 
of k. When the budget constraint is not binding the equilibrium audit 
probability is analogous to that found in Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1983)
(it dif fers slightly due to the assumption of risk neutrality and the absence 
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of habitually "honest" taxpayers) . 
The most obvious and desirable extension of this model is to consider 
a continuous distribution of income defined on an interval CI1,I2J where 
0 � I1 < I2. This introduces a number of technical difficulties. In 
particular, the choice of audit probability must be conditioned on reported 
income and can take virtually any form. Nevertheless, the restriction to two 
income levels is clearly strong and needs to be relaxed. The more general 
problem outlined above is addressed in Reinganum and Wilde (1984) under the 
assumption that the IRS faces no fixed budget, but rather maximizes its tax 
revenue net of auditing costs. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking the derivative of equation (1) with respect to 
• 
ai' substituting a = 
aj = ai for symmetry, and setting the result equal to 
zero gives 
• 
(1 - a ) q[ll1CTH + F - TL) + TL) 
• 
+ (1 - q +a q) ((k1/
2) (TH + F - TL) +TL) - TH = 0, (Al) 
• 
Solving for a and substituting where k1 = 112 + (1 - 112>111• 
k = (TH - TL) /(TH - TL + F) , and k2 = 
2111q + 1112 + (1 - 112>111J C1 - q) gives 
• a <111.112> as defined in (4) : 
• 0 a <111.112> = a  <111.112> = (2k - k2l/qCll2 - (1 + 112>1111. (A2) 
If the denominator is positive, then a mixed strategy TE exists and is unique 
so long as 0 < 2k - k2 < q[ll2 - (1 + p2>111J .  The right hand side of this 
inequality reduces to k < k1/2. If these inequalities fail, pure strategy 
equilibria exist and are unique (that cases A(i) , A(ii) , and A(iii) are 
mutually exclusive is easy to show -- see below) . 
If 112 - (1 + 112>111 � 0, then the mixed strategy equilibrium a0 still 
exists, but now when k1/
2 � k � k2/2. Since in this case k1 < k2, the pure 
strategy equilibria exist simultaneously with the mixed strategy equilibrium 
on the range [k1/2,k2/2J .  To see this, note that if one taxpayer always 
complies, then the cost of noncompliance to the other taxpayer is 
C(l,0; 111,fl2) q[pl(TH + F) + (
1 
- �l) TL) 
+ (1 - q) ((k1/
2) (TH + F - TL) - TL). 
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This is greater than or equal to TH (the cost of complying) if and only if 
k i k2/2. Similarly, if one taxpayer never complies, then the other taxpayer 
will never comply if and only if k 2 k1/2. 
Q. E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 1: This lemma follows trivially from differentiating equations 
(6) and (7). 
Q .E. D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: If a > 1, then al a is impossible so the only 
equilibrium has p1 = O = p2 in which case a = 
1. From (8), a> 1 is equivalent 
to c > q(TH + F - TL) -- case (A) . 
If a < 1, several possibilities exist. First, suppose a > a. Then 
A A 
fl1 (a) 1 and p2(a) is irrelevant. Furthermore, p2 - (1 + P2>p1 = -1 < O so 
case (B) of Proposition 1 applies. With P1 = 1, k1 1 and k2 = (1 + q) • 
• 
Since we are assuming a > a, the pure strategy equilibrium in which a = O is 
impossible. Thus we need only check the mixed strategy taxpayer equilibrium 
a0 and the pure-strategy a*(1,p2) = 1. The latter is an equilibrium so long 
as k 2 k1/
2, or in this case, k 2 1/2. The mixed strategy taxpayer 
equilibrium is part of a full equilibrium so long as k i k2/2. or in this case 
k � (1 + q)/2 (given a0(1,fl2> >a). 
Next. suppose a0<P1.p2> = a. Using the definition of 
equivalent to 
fl1 (a - l)q(l +fl ) - (1 - A ) = 
f(fl2). 2 "2 
fl2[aq + (1 - q)] - 2k 
0 a • this is 
(A3) 
Clearly f(O) > 0, but f(l) < 1 if and only if aq < 1 + q - 2k. Furthermore, 
sgn f'<P2> = sgn[aq - q - 1 + 2k). Hence a solution to (A3) such that 
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P1 s (0,1) and p2 e (0,1) exists if and only if condition (9) holds. In this 
case f(O) < 1 and f'(fl2) < 0 so in fact a whole range of such solutions exist. 
Condition (9) is implied by k i 1/2 but not by k i (1 + q)/2. Hence the 
difference between subcases (ii) and (iii). Finally, a< a can never be part 
A A 
of a full equilibrium since in this case p1(a) = 0 • p2(a) which implies 
• 
k1 = 0 = k2, so that case B(iii) of Proposition 1 applies and a (0,0) = 
1 is 
the taxpayers' best response. This contradicts a < a < 1. 
Q.E. D. 
Proof of Corollary 1: Recall the definition of f(fl2) from the proof of 
Proposition 2. Since f(O) > O and f(O) < 1 under condition (9), and since 
f(.) is differentiable with f'(.) < 0, it follows that f(l) < f(O) < 1. By 
the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists b a (0,1) such that f(b) = b. 
Q.E. D. 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARATIVE STATICS IN THE LIMITING CASE 
ao a k 
TL +* + 
TH +• - + 
F +* 
.. + 0 0 
q +* - 0 
c 0 + 0 
• Given k(l - q) � A. � k, the relevant 
case for a0 to be part of a NE. 
* 
a. 
1 
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